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I
WRITING in the June issue of the Yale Law Journal,' Dr. John Bauer
urged strongly that "prudent investment," as defined by him, be accepted
as the proper rate base for use in determining the return permitted to
public utility companies. I agree with his thesis that "cost" rather than
"value" should be the dominant consideration in the formulation of a
rate base. However, in view of the stated attempt of his article to exorcise
the "incanted ... concept of 'fair value,' 2 it is extraordinary that Dr.
Bauer should suggest the retention of one aspect of the "value" theorem,
through the reduction of the item of historical cost by "depreciation"
accruals. This fundamental misconception of the proper treatment of
depreciation distorts his definition of "cost" and, if accepted by regula-
tory agencies, would lead to inequities and to unnecessary replacement
expenditures, with a temptation to increase the return to stockholders at the
expense of otherwise attainable rate reductions.
Before discussing the fallacy in Dr. Bauer's thinking and indicating a
reasonable program for the treatment of the related but not identical prob-
lems connected with depreciation and the accumulation of depreciation
reserves, it is appropriate to reiterate the major threads in his argument.
In Dr. Bauer's formulation, the question of "value" is declared to be
wholly irrelevant to the determination of the amount of permissible return.
Recent court decisions are held to have cleared the way for the desirable
demise-of "fair value" as a rate base ingredient. Its final discard is deemed
to have been presaged by the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in 1942 in the Natural Gas Pipeline Company case.' Dr. Bauer finds no
conflict between Chief Justice Stone's statement, in the majority opinion,
that "The Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the service
of any single formula or combinations of formulas" ', and the statement
in the concurring opinion of Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy that
t President, The Hartford Electric Light Company.
1. Bauer, The Establshnent and Administration of a "Prudent Investment" Rate
Base (1944) 53 YAsm L. J. 495.
2. Bauer, supra note 1, at 495.
3. Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942).
4. Id. at 586.
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courts cannot "concern themselves with any issues as to the economic
merits of a rate base" and that the Federal Power Commission is now
freed from the compulsion of admitting evidence on reproduction cost or
of giving any weight to the element of "fair value." The Commission may
now adopt if it chooses, prudent investment as a rate base.6
Any residual doubts as to the necessity for considering "fair value" are
considered to have been dispelled by the decision of the Court in 1944 in
,the Hope Natural Gas case,' in which it was stated:
".. . Under the 'statutory standard' of just and reasonable it is the
result reached not the method employed which is controlling ...
The fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain
infirmities is not then important."
Dr. Bauer concludes that "No particular rate base provisions are imposed,
provided that the rates as fixed are all-around 'jdst and reasonable.' " 7
Whether or not our shift in concept is legally admissible everywhere it
is a fact that the utility industry has recognized the increasing public ac-
ceptance of the cost criterion and in its financing has sought to adjust itself
'to acceptance of cost as the new basis for rate-making. This has been
facilitated by the very large amount of new property built under price
levels very much higher than prevailed when the original plant and equip-
ment were constructed. This replacement of old properties, together with
additions of new plant has brought utility financing nearly into accord
with costs and thus diluted and made negligible earlier financing predicated
on the "value" concept.
II
As indicated above, I am completely in accord with Dr. Bauer's con-
clusion that an adoption of cost in place of value has been desirable from
the consumers' standpoint and has been in the interest of investors in
public .utility securities. But after interring the "value" concept, Dr.
Bauer proceeds to depart from the goal of applying a straight cost standard
by asserting that utility rate bases should be predicated not on original
cost, but on "original cost less depreciation." It is at this point that I am
forced to dissent vigorously from his views.
On this subject Dr. Bauer declares:
"If proper plant and depreciation accounting has been adhered to,
the total cost of the plant units less the depreciation reserve, is equal,
at any given time, to the investment actually made, the full amount
5. Id. at 606.
6. Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 320 U. S. 591, 602 (1944).
7. Bauer, supra note 1, at 504.
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having been preserved. But if adequate provisions for depreciation
have not been made directly or indirectly, interest and dividends may
have been paid from the consequent showing of corporate net income
and the investment correspondingly impaired ....
"'Prudent investment' is viewed at times, especially by people who
would gain thereby, as consisting of the gross original cost of all the
plant units devoted to public use without deduction of past deprecia-
tion due to physical and functional causes. The inapplicability of this
gross cost view appears clear if one considers that once a corporate
investment is made it must subsequently be fully maintained or it
will be impaired or dissipated. Such full maintenance consists of
ordinary repairs plus proper provisions for depreciation as it accrues,
both charged regularly to operating expenses .... "8
I believe this argument is erected on two fallacious assumptions: (a)
that "cost" is affected by depreciation; and (b) that the loss caused by
depredation is charged to expense as it actually accrues.
The fatal defect of the first assumption is that it smuggles a valua-
tion factor, i.e., the depreciation of plant and equipment, into the simple
historical task of recording cost. Yet it should be obvious that the factors
which compose "cost" and "value" are not synonymous and that the con-
cepts must not be confused. Strong testimony to this effect was given by
C. W. Smith, Chief of the Accounts, Finance, and Rates Division of the
Federal Power Commission in the Arkanuas Power & Light Co.' case:
"I agree that values are in a state of flux and I don't think any
accountant would argue that cost represents value. Cost represents
cost. I don't claim that cost represents value. I believe that value,
however, is an unnecessary process in the fixing of rates 1o... I agree
that the value of any property is the present worth of what it will
earn in the future. I agree, too, that the value of physical properties
of a business which is not earning money is scrap value." 1
There is no doubt that both appreciation and depreciation of property
materially affect values; but they cannot possibly alter the figure of actual
original property cost. Cost and value may indeed be identical at the date
of construction. But except through the fortuitous circumstance that
appreciation exactly offset depreciation in the case of a particular
property, cost and value could never be identical in subsequent years.
Consequently, when cost is substituted for value as the basis for regula-
tion, it necessarily follows that depreciation, i.e., loss in value-no longer
8. Id. at 506.
9. In the Matter of Arkansas Power & Light Co., Arkansas Department of Public
Utilities, Docket No. 225 (1944).
10. Id., p. 12 of transcript, for morning session, Feb. 24, 1944.
11. rd., p. 13, transcript for Feb. 23, 1944, session.
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should be taken into consideration, unless it has gone so far as to bring
about either withdrawal of a particular piece of property from service,
or its classification as no longer "used and useful."
The 1943 Report of the Committee on Depreciation of the National
Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners is led by a similar
confused commingling of value and cost concepts to conclude that the
depreciation reserve is not a separate fund, but a contra entry,12 which
reduces the fixed capital account. This fallacious argument probably stems
from an analogy to the accounting treatment of coal consumption in the
preparation of a year-end balance sheet. In this situation, the coal inven-
tory is very properly reduced by a contra entry equal to the charge to the
expense account."3 Since the burned coal is obviously no longer capable
of rendering service or creating earnings, failure to make the contra entry
would render the balance sheet untruthful. A very different situation
exists in the case of a utility company's lines and equipment. The fact
that an item for depreciation is included each year in a company's expense
accounts does not mean that any property has actually disappeared. The
same lines and equipment are still in operation, still rendering service to
the public, still producing earnings. The fact that the future life of any
given piece of equipment, after a year of service, is one year less than it
was before cannot possibly affect its actual cost although it obviously would
reduce its market value in the event of a sale.
Dr. Bauer's second fallacy is' to confuse the fact of depreciation with
the preparations made for reimbursement to the company for the cost of
withdrawn equipment. His position would seem to be that loss of value
takes place with the same uniformity and regularity as charges to expense,
made to facilitate recoupment of the cost of the property at the time of its
withdrawal from service. However, except for the slight wear and tear
component, the loss of value arising from physical or the more potent func-
tional causes occurs very irregularly, both as to magnitude and time of inci-
dence. In consequence, the depreciation reserve of any given company repre-
sents nothing more than a fund to permit reimbursement for capital when its
useful life terminates. In no sense do such reserves, as they exist at any
given date, measure the depreciation which has actually taken place in that
property, as of that date. Neither does the depreciation reserve on a cost
basis have any relation to the cost of replacement of property withdrawn.
It is the obligation of the company to maintain the service either by re-
placement of property withdrawn or by other means whatever the cost
may be. It is the cost of plant withdrawn which is to be reimbursed through
the depreciation reserve when that property has reached the end of its use-
ful life.
12. REPORT OF COMMIT=E ON DEPRECIATION OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RAILROAD
AND UTILITIES ComilssIo s (1943) § 13 of Summary and p. 32.
13. FEDERA. POWER COMMISSION UNIFORM SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTS (1937) § 131.
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III
The inequity Dr. Bauer seeks to correct by the "cost less depreciation"
standard is indicated by his statement that:
"If the original cost of plant were included in the rate base, the
company would get a return not only on its own actual or unimpaired
investment, but also on the amunt of customer contribution provided
in the rates for the purpose of conserving the corporate investment." ' 4
In the main, I am in accord with the objective indicated in the quotation,
namely, the elimination of inequitable enrichment of investors arising out
of the use of money paid in by customers "in order to maintain the integrity
of the investment in the service rendered." 11 However, as demonstrated
below, Dr. Bauer's suggested cure would merely substitute one inequity
for another. 6 In fact, because of the contradictions involved in the con-
cept of original cost less depreciation, the net property standard even fails
to comply with the principles enunciated by Dr. Bauer as requisite for an
effective rate base :lr
"Establishment of a rate base which can be systematically adminis-
tered requires (1) the adoption of a precise concept, (2) exact deter-
mination of initial amounts, and (3) continuous factual adjustments
as changes in the operating properties take place in order that accounts
and records may show definitely at any time the amount on which the
company is entitled to receive a reasonable return...."
The proposed "net property" base meets the first two of these tests, but
fails to reflect "factual adjustments as changes in the operating proper-
ties take place .... " Since under a cost basis of regulation, changes in
value as of any given date have no place on a utility's books of account or in
its rate base, "factual adjustments as changes in the operating properties
take place" can, properly speaking, be only such entries as represent with-
drawals from, or additions to plant and equipment.
On the other hand, the utilization of undepreciated original cost or gross
property as a rate base would permit compliance with all three of Dr.
Bauer's tests. Since, as indicated above, under the recent decision,", the
formula applied by the regulatory body is immaterial, utilization of the
original cost base could be required by utility Commissions, provided the
ultimate requirement of a just and reasonable return on the investment
14. Bauer, supra note 1, at 506-507.
15. See Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. 292 U. S. 151, 167 (1934).
16. See REPORT OF THE SPEMr. CoiurTns ox D-rnCIATioN oF THM AazEzcAu BAi
AssocYAriox (1944); RPoaT oF Com=Es ox ACCoUirWG ProenJui, ,i .mcAN Iz.-
snTruT oF AccouN-AuTs (1944).
17. Bauer, supra note 1, at 506.
18. Federal Power Comm, v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
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was met. In any particular rate case, it would be just as easy for the regula-
tory agency, after it had made its determination as to the "just and rea-
sonable" net income of a company, to phrase the permissible sum as a
lower percentage on gross property as to allow a higher percentage on
"net property." As a control and guide to operations an accounting sys-
tem based on cost, without any arbitrary writedown such as occurs in an
effort to determine net property, has many desirable features and avoids
the pitfalls inherent in the net property rate base.
/
IV
Dr. Bauer and the Report of the Committee on Depreciation of the
National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners seek to
phrase and treat as a single question, two separate and distinct problems:
1-The devisal of a method whereby the users of utility service
shall be assessed the original cost of physical plant, which is consumed
over a period of years.
2-The devisal of techniques for according equitable treatment of
money, paid in by consumers (to reimburse for property) and
retained by the company, pending the actual retirement of the prop-
erty.
Dr. Bauer and the authors of the NARUC report assume that both
problems may be equitably solved by establishing "original cost less de-
preciation reserve," or so-called "net property," as the rate base. This well-
intentioned attempt at over-simplification results in confused definitions
and is bound to eventuate in gross inequities, including the inducement to
premature and uneconomic replacement of property.
Of course, utility managements must make preparation for the eventual
and inevitable retirement of fixed capital by accumulation of a reserve.
But the collection of this money in preparation for eventual retirements
does not justify a writedown of cost on the books or in the rate base, on
any ground dependent on any aspect of depreciation. If amortization of
capital had received legal sanction and the funds accumulated for this
purpose were paid out to investors ('wihich is not the case), concomitant
writedowns in the cost items would be justifiable. However, the court
has not generally approved the amortization principle.1 9 In any event,
the amortization doctrine has nothing in common with depreciation, and the
advisability of amortization should be considered on its own merits, with-
out the confusion introduced by misuse of depreciation terminology.
19. Amortization of-capital was approved in Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 593 (1942), but this approval was carefully qualified as applicable
to "a business which can exist for only a limited term ... "
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V.
The inequities occasioned by deduction of depreciation reserve accruals
from capital accounts in the past were obscured by the rapid growth of
the utilities industry. The results become apparent, however, when the
problem is simplified by considering the case of a static company, as in the
subjoined analysis. Most students will concede that this assumption is not
academic and that the, industry is growing towards -this static position.
(In fact, this state of affairs already exists in lesser degree, whenever the
credits to a particular company's depreciation reserve in any given year
exceed the sums expended on additions to, or replacement of, property.
A recent report by the Federal Power Commission demonstrates that this
situation prevailed for the industry as a whole during 1942? °)
Case One, Example of Inequitable Condition
1. Assume that a particular piece of property had cost $1,000,000 and
that 6% was considered a fair rate of return, i.e., $60,000.
2. Assume the depreciation reserve was accumulated on a straight line
basis and that the reserve after a period of years has reached the sum of
$200,000.
3. Assume the company's capitalization was $400,000 of 4% bonds
and $600,000 of stock.
In this situation, the $60,000 of permitted earnings, after covering the
$16,000 required for bond interest annually, would leave $44,000 for the
payment of dividends to stockholders and the accumulation of a surplus.
Under the above assumption of an accumulation of $200,000, and if
the "net property" concept were applied, the rate base would have to be
reduced to $800,000. Accordingly, under the maximum 6% rate of return
rule, permitted earnings from operations would be cut from $60,000 to
$48,000 anmually. Even assuming the depreciation reserve were invested
in suitable securities, it is dubious that the return on the fund would be
more than 2%, or $4,000. Accordingly, the company's total earnings would
be $52,000; after deduction of bond interest, the sum available for pay-
ment of dividends and accumulation of surplus would be only $36,000, or
82% of the former amount. The full fair return, i.e., $60,000, could not
again be earned, until withdrawals had been made to the full extent of the
reserve.
The possession of the $200,000 reserve by the company is in no sense
a return of principal to investors; the assets of the reserve were paid in for
20. FEDERAL POWER COmmISSION RXLEASE, FiN;ANcLL REcoRD OF TEra ELECTICAL
Uxrirvm INtusmY 1937-1942 (1943) 7.
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the specific purpose of covering retirements and must eventually be used for
this purpose.
In the above example, the problem has been analyzed as it would exist
when a reserve of 20%o of cost had been accumulated. However, it is
universally admitted, that the application of the presently approved straight
line method of depreciation eventually results in accumulation of a reserve
of 45%o' of the original fixed capital account.21 Under the "net property"
concept, there would be a corresponding decrease in the permitted return,
although presumably identical service was being rendered to consumers
and although there had been no return to the investors, who furnished the
capital.
There is no justice in a concept which requires stockholders to accept a
continuously diminishing income as the reserve grows. Nor is there any
likelihood that regulatory bodies would rule as fair a larger and larger
rate of return with the growth of the reserve.
It is apparent from the above discussion that utility managers in the
interest of their investors would be under constant temptation to make
premature and uneconomic replacements of plant and equipment in order
to diminish the size of the reserve in relation to property cost. Once again
the situation is best illustrated with a specific example.
Case Two
The Hartford Electric Light Company owns an old low pressure steam
plant built 40 years ago; the ages of existing turbines vary from 25 to 30
years; total nameplate rating is 36,000 KW. The fuel consumption of this
plant is very high (2.2 lbs.) as compared to modern performances; its
operation, however, is simple and extremely reliable. This plant has been
run for so few hours, during the past ten years, that its efficiency is wholly
immaterial. However, the retention of the plant is essential for the rendi-
tion of full continuous service, and it fulfills all requirements of a necessary
reserve to the modern 40,000 KW units, located in a newer and more effi-
cient station, which normally carry the load.
The old plant is carried on the books at its cost figure of $3,000,000.
Duiing its life the depreciation rates, as charged by the company to ex-
pense, have averaged in excess of 32 7, so that it might be said to have
been fully amortized. Replacement with a new and efficient unit has every
appearance of reasonableness, save that there is no service need for a new
plant. At today's prices, the cost of replacement with an efficient high
pressure unit would be $4,000,000.
21. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. 151 (1934), concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Butler, at 181; REPORT OF COMMITTm ON DEPREciATuoN oF NATiONAL
ASSOCIATION OF RAILROAD AND UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS (1943), 220; (1944) 69.
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The total original cost of all properties of the Hartford Electric Light
Company is approximately $40,000,000; the depreciation reserve now
stands at $10,000,000. If the "net property" theory were applied, under
the conditions outlined above, the Company's permissible earnings, at an





Permitted Earnings at 6Y % 1,950,000
If, however, the old low pressure units were replaced by a new unit,
costing approximately $4,000,000, the permissible earnings figure would





Permitted Earnings at 6Y % 2,210,000
This situation presents a great temptation to perpetrate the economic
waste involved in spending $4,000,000, although, as indicated previously,
there would be little benefit in terms of reduced operating costs or any in-
crease in useful capacity. Even on the assumption that the company would
have to borrow all the funds needed to defray the construction costs,
erection of the new unit would materially benefit stockholders. The neces-
sary $4,000,000 could readily be borrowed at 37o; subtracting the $120,-
000 of new interest charges from the $260,000 of increased earnings per-
mitted by erection of the new unit would leave a net increase of $140,000
of income allocable to stockholders.
Moreover, the increase in consumer payments to the company would
materially exceed the $260,000 of augmented earnings, as the increase in
income would necessitate larger income and electric energy excise tax pay-
ments. The addition to the capital account would also occasion an increase
in the annual charge for depreciation. Cumulatively, construction of the
new unit would probably permit the company to collect more than $350,000
from consumers anually in the form of prices higher than necessary with-
out any useful purpose being attained thereby.
1944]
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If, on the other hand, the regulatory commissions utilized undepreciated
cost as' the rate base, there would be no temptation to benefit stockholders
at the expense of consumers by unnecessary plant expenditures. Since the
regulatory body has the final authority to determine what constitutes a
fair return (assuming there is no question of confiscation), it could readily
provide for application of a lower percentile figure on the undepreciated
base than would be required on a net property base, and still arrive at the
same fair dollar return. Consistent application of undepreciated cost as a
rate base would prevent unnecessary replacements without in any way
deterring those additions to plant and equipment which would be eco-
nomically beneficial.
The importance of this problem will be accentuated after the war be-
cause the probable elimination or dimunition of the excess profits tax bur-
den will bring a reduction in utility expenses. If undepreciated cost is used
as the rate base, it will be possible in most instances to convert these cost
savings into an instrument for reducing rates. However, if Dr. Bauer's
"net property" concept is adopted, managements will be tempted to make
premature retirements as a legitimate method of utilizing the reduction in
expense to augment permissible earnings, rather than to pass rate decreases
on to consumers. Undoubtedly, many managements would resist this temp-
tation, but it seems senseless to adopt a rate base formula which offers so
great an inducement to wasteful expenditure.
V.I.
I believe it is essential to separate the problem of providing for depre-
ciation from the equally important problem *of determining the equitable
treatment to be accorded to customer payments, held by the company for
the purpose of covering retirements; and to solve each problem on its
merits.
1. The regulatory agency, of course, should have the responsibility for
fixing the desirable size of the replacement reserve. Except in freak cases,
15 to 20% of fixed capital, in lieu of the present 45% maximum figure,
should be ample to ensure continuance of satisfactory service to consumers
and to protect the investors' equity in the property.
22
The regulatory body should then devise a simple formula, which could
be applied to the historical data on the books of utility companies to deter-
mine the annual accruals to the depreciation reserve. This formula should
22. The Report of the Edison Electric Institute to the Committee on Depreciation of
the National Association of Railroads and Utilities Commissioners of Feb. 2, 1944, Indi-
cated that the maximum industry-wide call on the reserve in any one year had never exceeded
5%% of fixed capital. The figures used in the text visualize a safety factor of 3 or 4.
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be designed to create and nmaintait the reserve at the desired figure. Man-
agement should not be permitted any discretion in the annual application
of this formula in its earnings statement.
The present technique is to stipulate an arbitrary annual accrual on the
basis of guesses as to provable service lives without regard to the size of
the reserve. The foregoing method proposes to have the regulatory agency
fix the size of the reserve and then let the amount of the annual accruals
be determined by a formula based on experience.
2. If customers' money is used for ordinary corporate purposes, it
should be credited with equitable earnings out of the permitted return.
The amount of these customer earnings should be specified by the
regulatory agency, with recognition of the fact that the company could
obtain funds necessary for expansion elsewhere, if an undue share of the
earnings were allocated to the senior money, constituting the assets corre-
sponding to the reserve liability.
Earnings credited to the reserve from the permitted total company return
would correspondingly reduce the amount to be charged to expense as de-
preciation in accruals. As the reduction in expense directly affects the per-
missible rate of return, the earnings would benefit the customers, to the
same extent as though paid to them in cash.
VII
The problem of determining proper methods of depreciation account-
ing has been needlessly complicated by the attempt to devise one pat solu-
tion for the two problems of collecting the original cost of property and of
according fair treatment to consumers' money retained by the Company,
pending retirements of property.
Once the distinction between these problems is recognized, there will be
opportunity for public opinion to consider and evaluate proposed solutions
for each. The present confusion makes it impossible for anyone but an
expert to understand the issues at stake or to realize that Dr. Bauer's "net
property" concept entails an arbitrary writedown of fixed property ac-
counts. Such writedowns, although they have an exactly reverse effect to
the "write ups" in property accounts placed on the books in the past by
many utility managements, are subject to many of the same objections.
It is scarcely to be expected that public opinion-which has reacted so
adversely to arbitrary alteration in historical cost figures, when made in
an upward direction, as to require retroactive elimination of such changes-
will approve arbitrary alterations, when made in a downward direction,
unless the issues are made clear.
Precise delimitation of the issues of debate between Dr. Bauer and my-
self is assisted by a summary statement of undisputed points. We both
1944]
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agree that the cost of replacing plant consumed over the years is an expense
of rendering service. We both agree that an allowance for this cost must
be included in the rates which utility companies are permitted to charge
for service. We both agree that the Company receives as cash the customer
payments made in accordance with permitted rates. The difference of
opinion revolves about the treatment to be accorded to those amounts which
companies are permitted to collect from customers for a particular purpose
prior to the corresponding property retirements.
No solution or agreement is possible so long as the two problems are
treated as one and camouflaged by plausible phrases such as are contained
in Dr. Bauer's article. Stripped of misleading verbiage, Dr. Bauer and the
NARUC report recommend. the amortization of capital, under the pre-
tense of accounting for depreciation. If amortization is to be adopted
as a public policy, its merits should be debated publicly rather than attained
by indirection or by slavish adherence to accounting conventions.3
23. See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Federal Power Comm. v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 643-44, n. 40 (1944) :
"To make a fetish of mere accounting is to shield from examination the deeper causes,
forces, movements, and conditions which should govern rates. Even as a recording of
current transactions, bookkeeping is hardly an exact science. As a representation of the
condition and trend of a business, it uses symbols of certainty to express values that actually
are in a constant flux. It may be said that in commercial or investment banking or any
business extending credit success depends on knowing what not to believe in accounting.
Few concerns go into bankruptcy or reorganization whose books do not show them solvent
and often even profitable. If one cannot rely on accountancy accurately to disclose past
or current conditions of a business, the fallacy of using it as a sole guide to future price
policy ought to be apparent. However, our quest for certitude is so ardent that we pay
an irrational reverence to a technique which uses symbols of certainty, even though experi-
ence again and again warns us that they are delusive... "
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